“Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.” –John F. Kennedy
Once again, California political leaders failed us in managing the Palisades, Eaton, and Hurst Los Angeles wildfires. Their annual preferred media rhetoric promise improvements and more funding after each wildfire. However, they do not heed the lessons from recent California wind-stoked wildfire incidents. Nor do they remember the promises made after each incident. To date, twenty-four lives have been lost by these Los Angeles wildfire disasters, and some believe the economic damage could exceed $225 billion, the costliest in our country’s history.
Long History of California Wildfire Disasters
Despite our long history of wildfire disasters seared into the memories of every California resident, no one takes the necessary actions to implement policies and practices to ensure the future health and safety of residents of the Golden State to mitigate wildfire risk. Take the November 2018 Malibu wildfire, which destroyed 97,000 acres and almost 16,000 structures. Or the November 2018 Camp wildfire, which destroyed the town of Paradise, killing 85 people and destroying 18,000 structures and 153,000 acres. The October 2017 Tubbs-Santa Rosa wildfire damaged 6,000 structures and 20,000 acres. Or even the August 2023 Lahaina wildfire, which killed 102 people, and destroyed the cultural town of Lahaina, 2,200 structures, and 17,000 acres. The November 1961 Bel Air wildfire in the neighboring canyon east of the current Palisades wildfire should have been a stark reminder—in that blaze, 484 homes and over 6,000 acres were destroyed.
Red Flag Warnings – a high likelihood of Wildfire Risk in Southern California
Each of these incidents directly resulted from forecasted high-wind conditions in Red Flag warning areas. Those who live in Southern California know that high winds and dry conditions cause us to expect wildfire incidents. So, when we were informed in mid-December that the only Red Flag warning issued for the entire United States (via the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho) covered the coastal Southern California region, we knew there was a high likelihood of wildfire risk. Our winter left little rainfall, and when a long-term forecast came out in late December calling for Santa Ana winds in early January, we all feared another wildfire occurrence.
Our tribal instincts were correct. But where were the coordinated efforts of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, the Los Angeles City Fire Department, and California’s Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) to put in place contingency plans for the:
- Immediate deployment of assets (personnel, tankers, hand-crews)?
- Prepositioning of Cal Fire Incident Command Teams (think of them as the crisis managers specifically trained to manage complex wildfire incidents)?
- Prepositioning of bulldozers (the only heavy equipment asset capable of establishing a wildfire perimeter (i.e., fire break) to fight wind-driven wildfire events)?
- Prepositioning of helicopters and fixed-winged air tankers capable of performing day and night-time water and retardant drops (note tankers are not allowed to fly at night)?
- In-advance communication between City of Los Angeles Fire Department personnel and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power personnel to understand water availability risk?
- In-advance incident management coordination among all agencies is needed to determine the likelihood of a major wildfire event in Southern California.
No one disputes that Santa Ana winds with 70 to 90 mph gusts throughout the first 30 hours of the Palisades wildfire make establishing a secure wildfire perimeter virtually impossible. Chief Brian Fennessy of the Orange County Fire Department stated, “The Palisades fire was unstoppable” during this initial period. For example, helicopters and fixed-winged air tankers cannot fly in 50 mph or greater wind conditions.
Could the chaos on January 7, 2025, at the start of the Palisades and Eaton wildfires, have been better controlled given that the wind conditions present at the time and predicted as part of the Red Flag warnings?
First 24 Hours – the most critical times to control any wildfire incident
For those who have learned about past wildfire events, the first two to 24 hours, called the initial attack, are the most critical times to control any wildfire incident. In 2012, Rand Corporation concluded that initial attack success has ten-fold economic savings compared to wildfires allowed to burn after the first 24 hours. Moreover, virtually every ” after-action ” report from the Malibu, Camp, Tubbs, Lahaina, and Bel Air wildfires recommends better prepositioning and planning as a critical success factor for fighting wildfires, particularly during the initial attack.
Let’s examine some daily incident command reports issued by Cal Fire to understand the reaction times and measure the prepositioning efforts of responsible firefighting agencies for the Los Angeles wildfires.
Palisades Wildfire (wildfire started at 10:30 am January 7, 2025)
Numerous firefighting air tankers throughout California are flying fire suppression missions as conditions allow. Cal Fire did not report the number and type.
Eaton (Alta Dena) Wildfire (wildfire started at 6:18 pm January 7, 2025)
Numerous firefighting air tankers throughout the State are flying fire suppression missions as conditions allow. Cal Fire did not report the number and type.
Hurst (Sylmar) Wildfire (wildfire started at 10:29 pm January 7, 2025)
Numerous firefighting air tankers throughout the State are flying fire suppression missions as conditions allow. Cal Fire did not report the number and type.
As had been forecasted, high-wind and wind-gust conditions (up to 70 mph) during the afternoon of January 7 and throughout the entire night of January 8, particularly for regions involved with the Palisades and Eaton wildfires, prevented the use of any night-flying helicopters. In addition, fixed-winged air tankers are not allowed to fly at night due to Federal regulations, nor could they be in the conditions present on January 7 and the night of January 8.
Some water-dropping helicopters and fixed-winged air tankers began flying on the morning of January 8. Those helicopters were enabled to fly at night and continued to drop water, but none used fire retardant, the more effective fire suppression method.
So, what are the takeaways from this analysis?
1. Where were the prepositioned assets on the mornings of January 7 and January 8?
Knowing the high wind conditions would ground helicopters and fixed-winged air tankers on January 7, where were the bulldozers?
The analysis above shows that only four bulldozers worked the Palisades fire on January 8; also, eight bulldozers were deployed to the Eaton fire that day. However, the tell is the number later deployed—by January 15, eight days into each wildfire, 66 dozers were activated for the Palisades fire and 25 for the Eaton fire.
Given known conditions, wouldn’t it have been prudent to preposition an increased number of these assets – the only ones capable of establishing a fire line in heavy wind events? And despite the herculean efforts of the Eaton firefighters in the video below (well into that incident on January 13), fire line clearing by hand crews is not as effective as bulldozers, mainly when time is of the essence. More importantly, on the morning of January 8, reduced wind conditions were predicted, allowing helicopter and fixed-winged air tankers to be deployed. Why weren’t more fixed air tankers with retardant capability prepositioned and put into the fight that morning?
Los Angeles Fire Chief Faces Calls for Resignation
2. Why did it take almost two days to deploy Cal Fire’s Incident Management Teams after the start of the Palisades and Eaton wildfires?
These teams are experts in managing and coordinating complex wildfire events. Cal Fire states in their January 7 (4:06 pm for the Palisades incident) that “Cal Fire Incident Management Team II activated to assist Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City firefighters….”
For the Eaton wildfire, Cal Fire’s Incident Management Team III was requested at 8:00 pm on January 8, 2025, and transitioned into command at 9:00 am on January 9, 2025 (almost 40 hours after the start of the wildfire). Prepositioning and immediate deployment of these teams could have reduced the chaos encountered during the first 24 hours of both incidents and likely saved lives, property, and structures.
3. When will Federal regulators allow night flying for fixed-wing retardant-dropping air tankers?
Wildfires do not stop at night. Why can’t all of the country’s aerial firefighting assets be used at night? Years and years of debate with US Forest Service bureaucrats has constantly stymied common sense.
4. Where was Cal Fire’s highly touted fleet of aerial firefighting assets, including the C-130 and the Grumman S-2’s?
None of the incident command reports identify the source or type of aerial firefighting assets deployed. Based on first-hand observations and conversations with the Eaton Incident Command team, it appears that few, if any, Cal Fire aircraft were deployed to any of the Los Angeles wildfires. City, county, and neighboring counties, like Orange County, supplied most aircraft. However, independent aerial firefighting contractors supplied the water scoopers, the DC-10, and virtually all of the jet aircraft, presumably under Cal Fire/US Forest Service Call When Needed Contracts.
We do not yet know whether the Cal Fire fleet of over 60 aircraft was undergoing its annual maintenance cycle.
5. When will firefighting agencies implement artificial intelligence tools to predict wildfire behavior, allowing wildfire perimeters and fuel breaks to be established more quickly?
Significant advances have been made to improve predictive wildfire mapping, particularly AI ones. These tools consider wild, humidity, topography, and historical wildfire events.
Cal Fire and the US Forest Service should team up to establish a contest for those AI wildfire-focused organizations to put in place the best applications for use by these agencies. Perhaps using the Los Angeles wildfires as a base case would be an instructive start.
Finally, to each member of the firefighting community, you inspire us with your courage, stamina, and professionalism. Thank you for protecting us in horrific circumstances.
This blog and my book “Running Out of Time—Wildfires and Our Imperiled Forests” intend to improve our communities. And take our politicians and bureaucrats to task. We have the resources, the technology, and the know-how. Do we have the will to change policies to significantly reduce the number and veracity of most wildfire events? – David Auchterlonie, Southern California resident.
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